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CASENOTES

Hudson v. Palmer: Closing the "Iron
Curtain" on Fourth Amendment
Protection in Prison Cells
I.

INTRODUCTION

An American prison inmate of the 19th century was considered
devoid of any constitutional rights, a mere "slave of the state."' The
courts of recent years, however, have taken up the cause of civil rights
for prisoners, at least in areas of fundamental constitutional rights. 2
Inmates have been afforded some form of constitutional protection against invidious racial discrimination, 3 procedural due process
1. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). Woody Ruffin,
an inmate at a state penitentiary, was convicted of murdering a guard while trying
to escape from a work camp on the railroad. In rejecting his appeal for a new trial
in the county where the crime was committed, rather than in Richmond, the Court
of Appeals of Virginia said:
For the time being, during his term of service in the penitentiary, he is
in a state of penal servitude to the State. He has, as a consequence of his
crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those
which the law of humanity accords him. He is for the time being a slave
of the state. He is civiliter mortuus: and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a dead man.
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society
of free men, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men
have some rights it is true, such as the law in its benignity accords them,
but not the rights of free men. They are the slaves of the State undergoing
punishment for heinous crimes committed against the laws of the land. While
in this state of penal servitude, they must be subject to the regulations of
the institution of which they are inmates, and the laws of the state to whom
their service is due in expiation of their crimes.
Id. at 796.
2. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("[T]hough his rights
may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned
for a crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons
of this country."). See infra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
3. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (Alabama statutes requiring racial
segregation in prisons and jails violated the fourteenth amendment; a desegregation
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5
violations, 4 and cruel and unusual punishment. Prisoners also have

7
rights to gain access to the courts, 6 to exercise religious freedom,

and to exercise free speech.' The existence and extent of these limited
prisoners' rights have led United States Supreme Court Chief Justice
Warren Burger to comment: "The continuing guarantee of these
substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a belief that the
way society treats those who have transgressed against it is evidence
9
of the essential character of that society."
Although prisoners' rights have been significantly expanded over
the last one hundred years, they are still much more limited than
the rights of ordinary citizens. Courts have justified the restriction
and sometimes complete withdrawal of prisoners' rights and privileges
plan was ordered.). See also Henry v. Van Cleve, 469 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1972) (Where

a black inmate alleged that he was denied visiting privileges because of his race,
the district court erred in dismissing the suit without an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was an infringement of a constitutional right.); McClelland v.
Sigler, 456 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1972) (Segregation of prison was unconstitutional,
despite claim by officials that segregation was necessary to maintain order.).
4. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (Inmates are entitled to due process in disciplinary proceedings). Due process protections are very limited, though.
The Supreme Court held in Baxter v. Palmigiano that a prisoner has no right to
counsel at a disciplinary hearing, that the prisoner's silence could be used against
him, and that prison officials could deny an inmate the right to confront witnesses
without providing reasons. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 314-23 (1976).
5. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (Prison conditions which involve
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain or which become punishment that is
disproportionate to the severity of the crime constitute cruel and unusual punishment.); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.).
6. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (Restricting access of prisoners
to attorneys and licensed private investigators only, thereby precluding access by
paralegals and law students for purposes of interviewing prisoners, constituted unjustifiable restriction on the access to the courts.); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969) (State cannot bar inmates from giving fellow inmates assistance in preparing
petitions for post-conviction relief unless some reasonable alternative is provided for
illiterate and poorly educated inmates.).
7. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Prison officials must provide inmates
who practice unconventional religious beliefs opportunity to practice their beliefs comparable to opportunity provided to inmates with conventional beliefs.).
8. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (A prison regulation which
barred press interviews with specific inmates did not violate inmate's first amendment
right to free speech, given the alternative methods of communication available and
the "legitimate penological objectives" of the regulation.); Procunier v. Martinez,
461 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (Censorship of prisoners' outgoing mail can only be justified
by a showing of a substantial government interest and a restriction no greater than
is essential to protect the interest.).
9. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3198-99 (1984).
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on the basis of furthering legitimate penological goals.'" The goal most
often advanced by prison officials and accepted by courts as a
legitimate reason to abrogate prisoners' rights has been the maintenance
of prison security." The fact of confinement also has been found
to be a legitimate reason for curtailment of those rights.' 2
Prisoners probably have had the least amount of success in seek-

ing constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures

under the fourth amendment.' 3 Neither a warrant" nor a probable

cause" determination is required before prison officials conduct a
search in a prison context. Strip searches,' 6 body cavity searches,' 7

10. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). In holding that courts of appeal have discretionary authority to decide whether or not a prisoner can be brought
to a court room to argue his own appeal, and that a prisoner has no absolute right
to argue his own appeal or be in the court, the Court said "[l]awful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,
a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Id. at 285.
11. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979). The Court in Bell also made
it clear that this principle applies not only to convicted inmates, but also to pretrial
detainees. Id. See also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974). (Along with the
penal goals of crime deterrence and rehabilitation, the central objective of institutional security must be considered in determining whether a prisoner's constitutional
rights have been violated.); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974)
(Government interests of preserving internal order and maintaining prison security
"against escape or unauthorized entry" justified imposing restrictions on prisoner
correspondence.).
12. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977).
13. See generally Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures.- "Locking"
the Fourth Amendment Out of CorrectionalFacilities, 62 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1976)
(detailed survey of fourth amendment rights in prison context) [hereinafter cited as
Giannelli & Gilligan]. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 510 (1979). "[Elven the most zealous advocate
of prisoners' rights would not suggest that a warrant is required to conduct [an unannounced search of an inmate's cell]." Id. at 557 (1979).
15. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.9 at 399 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as W. LAFAVE]. "Indeed, it would seem that a cell may be searched, without any
suspicion existing as to it or its occupants, when that search is undertaken pursuant
to an established routine of making such inspections periodically." Id.
16. Id. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558 (strip searches and body cavity searches conducted after every "contact visit" by a prisoner with a person from outside the prison
held not to violate the fourth amendment).
17. Id.
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interceptions of conversations' 8 and mail,' 9 and searches of prison
cells2" have all been held by courts to be reasonable under the fourth

amendment.
Most courts faced with a fourth amendment challenge by a
prisoner have found the search or seizure unconstitutional only if conducted for some illegitimate purpose, such as when conducted to harass
or humiliate a prisoner. 2 ' That limited fourth amendment protection
was all but eliminated last year, when the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Hudson v. Palmer,2 held that a prisoner has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in a prison cell. 23 Hence, searches and seizures
of prison cells, even if conducted to harass and humiliate the prison
inmate, are per se reasonable and outside the proscriptions of the
24
fourth amendment.
Prisoners and normal citizens alike have enjoyed the right to take
their constitutional complaints into federal courts by suing under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 25 The number of these actions has increased steadily
and substantially during the last twenty years, and the Supreme Court
has responded by limiting actions giving rise to a constitutional viola-

18. Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972) (Court of appeals upheld
the dismissal of complaint by prisoner that monitoring his private conversations with
visitors violated his fourth amendment right of privacy.).
19. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Stroud v. United States, 251
U.S. 15 (1919) (Letter written by a prisoner accused of killing a guard held not to
be excludable at his trial, even though it was given to the warden instead of placed
in the mail.).
20. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 557 (1979) (The court upheld against a fourth
amendment challenge a prison policy of conducting unannounced, irregular searches
of inmates' cells, during which the inmates were required to stand outside the cell.).
21. See infra note 96. See also Thornton v. Redman, 435 F. Supp. 876, 880
(D. Del. 1977) ("Regardless of whether reliance is on the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, the standard would appear to be the same: the Constitution protects a prisoner
from arbitrary seizure of or interference with items of personal property by state
officials acting under color of law.").
22. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
23. Id. at 3202.
24. Id.
25. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
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2
tion of due process under the fourteenth amendment. " In Hudson
the Court followed this course by holding that intentional deprivations of property by persons acting under color of law do not always
27
amount to due process violations under the fourteenth amendment.
When they do not, section 1983 is not available and the complainant
must seek redress elsewhere. 8
This note will examine both the fourth amendment and the due
process holdings in Hudson, where they evolved from jurisprudentially,
and the basis for the Court's decision on each issue. It will critically
analyze the Court's bright line approach to the fourth amendment
issue and how it is fundamentally incompatible with the due process
holding. Finally this note will examine the implications of both these
holdings: how the due process issue will affect prisoners and citizens;
where the logical stopping point is in the Court's due process analysis;
how the fourth amendment decision will affect prisoners and prison
administrators; and how Hudson compares with recent fourth amendment jurisprudence.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides redress in federal courts to persons
who are deprived of "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and its laws" by any person acting under the color of
law of a state, territory or the District of Columbia.29 Passed in 1871,
30
section 1983 remained somewhat dormant for 90 years. Then, in
3
1961, the United States Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape, '
32 in federal
which evolved into a catalyst for an "explosion of actions"
26. See infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text.
27. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3204.
28. Section 1983 provides redress only for deprivations that violate the constitution or federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
29. Id.
30. See Smolla, The Displacement of FederalDue Process Claims by State Tort
Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 82 U. ILL.
L. REv. 831, 831 (19821 [hereinafter cited as Smolla]; Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts,
79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Whitman]; Note, Defining the
Parameters of Section 1983: Parratt v. Taylor, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Defining the Parameters].
31. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Monroe was overruled on the holding that a municipal
body is entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983.).
32. "Between 1961 and 1979, the number of federal filings under section 1983
(excluding suits by prisoners) increased from 296 to 13,168. Civil rights petitions
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courts by persons alleging all types of civil rights violations.33

In Monroe the Supreme Court held that section 1983 provides
a remedy to persons "deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and
immunities by an official's abuse of his position," regardless of whether
or not the official was acting in conformity with state law. 3" The Court
also held that this remedy is supplemental to any state remedy and
thus a person need not first seek redress in state court before filing
a section 1983 suit.3" Monroe was especially important to prisoners
suing over prison conditions, who previously could only seek habeas
corpus relief in federal courts. 6
A great deal of criticism has been levied upon the no-exhaustion
rule enunciated in Monroe and the resulting flood of litigation.3 7 The
Supreme Court has not been deaf to this criticism and has made attempts to curtail section 1983 litigation. 38 In one of the most signifiby state prisoners increased from 218 cases in 1966 to 11,195 in 1979." Whitman,
supra note 30, at 6 (citing 1979 AD. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR 6; 1975
AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR 194). For more recent statistics on prisoner
filings, see infra note 204.

33. Whitman, supra note 30, at 6.
34. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.

35. Id.at 183.

36. See J. GOBERTAND & N. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.00, at 2-3
[hereinafter cited as GOBERTAND & COHEN]. "IT]he Supreme Court, by resurrecting
the functional utility of the Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provided prisoners
with an attractive procedural vehicle for challenging prison conditions and practices."
The authors point out several advantages of a § 1983 suit over a habeas corpus suit.
First, no exhaustion of other remedies is required. Second, § 1983 provides for many
types of relief, including damages, which cannot be collected in a habeas corpus
action. Third, federal courts are less likely to abstain from interference with prison
administration in § 1983 suits. Fourth, courts are more likely to find class action
suits appropriate if filed under § 1983. And finally, section 1983 is governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which allow for more liberal discovery than what
might be allowed in habeas corpus actions. Id. § 3.02, at 67.
37. For a partial list of commentaries on the rising tide of litigation, see Whitman, supra note 30, at 6 n.10; Smolla, supra note 30, at 883 n.7.
38. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (use of standing doctrine
to bar a § 1983 action); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (Common law
immunity doctrines extend to § 1983 actions.); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)
(Existence of an available forum for raising constitutional issues in state judicial proceeding precluded § 1983 action.); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh
amendment barred class action suit in federal court where private parties sought to
impose liability payable from public funds in the state treasury.); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90 (1981) (Res judicata effect of a state judgment on a search and seizure
issue barred relitigation under § 1983.).
In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Court held that students did
not have a § 1983 claim for deprivation of liberty without due process of law when
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39
cant section 1983 cases since Monroe, Parratt v. Taylor, the Court
limited the reach of section 1983 in procedural due process claims."'
The Court held that a negligent deprivation of property by an official acting under color of law caused by a random, unauthorized
act does not violate the fourteenth amendment's proscription against
deprivations of life, liberty and property without due process of law
when the state provides adequate post-deprivation process.',
In Parratt a prison inmate sued the warden and the hobby
manager of the prison to recover $23.50, the cost of a hobby kit
2
allegedly lost as a result of the negligence of prison officials. The
3
suit was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Supreme Court found no cause of action in an opinion that both4
rights statute."
expanded and contracted the availability of the civil

First, the Court rejected the argument that section 1983 is limited

they were subjected to corporal punishment by school authorities without a hearing.
The Court said that predeprivation process was not necessary in the case of school
punishments because common law redress for excessive punishment was adequate.
The Court further limited its holding: "Were it not for the common-law privilege
permitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on children in their
care, and the availability of the traditional remedies for abuse, the case for requiring
advance procedural safeguards would be strong indeed." Id. at 674. In a footnote, the Court said absent this common law privilege, "it is doubtful whether any
procedure short of a trial in criminal or juvenile court could satisfy the requirements
of procedural due process for imposition of such punishment." Id. at 674 n.44. But
see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public high school student facing suspension of 10 days or less entitled to oral or written notice of changes, an explanation
of evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story).
39. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
40. The main issue before the Court was whether the negligence of a state
official will support a claim for relief under § 1983. Id. at 532. The Court had
previously been faced with the issue but did not reach it. See Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137 (1979); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).

41. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543.
42. Id. at 530.

43. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) provides:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by an person: ... (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
44. Id. at 535, 543. For a thorough examination of the Court's expansion and
contraction approach to § 1983, see Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing
the Door on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited
as Friedman].
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to intentional actions by state officials."5 The Court reaffirmed the
principle stated in Monroe v. Pape, that '[Section 1983] should be
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. '
Next, the Court examined whether the prisoner's claim stated a
violation of the constitution or laws as required by section 1983."'
The prisoner had alleged that his fourteenth amendment protection
against deprivations of property without due process of law was
violated." The Court held that no fourteenth amendment claim had
been alleged simply on the basis of a lack of predeprivation process. 9
The requirement that an opportunity to be heard be granted 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner".' 50 could be met by
adequate post-deprivation process where the state could not practically
provide meaningful predeprivation process. 5 ' The state cannot practicably provide predeprivation process, the Court reasoned, when a
state official deprives a person of property as a result of a random
and unauthorized negligent act which did not occur as a result of
some established state procedure. 52
The Court refused to extend the Parrattholding to deprivations
which were committed in accordance with established state procedure
in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush.5 3 The state procedure in question was
an Illinois law requiring the State Fair Employment Practices Commission to convene a factfinding conference within 120 days after an
employee filed a complaint with the Commission against an employer.'
In Logan the Commission failed to convene within the statutory period
and the employer moved for dismissal.55 In reversing the state supreme
court's granting of dismissal, the Supreme Court held that where a
state law operated to destroy a person's property interest without a
45. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535.
46. Id. (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)).
47. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 540-41.

50. Id. at 540 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 589 (1931)). Noting
that meaningful time and manner does not always require a hearing prior to deprivation, the Court reasoned that when the loss is not the result of an established state
procedure and the state cannot predict when the deprivation will take place, due
process only requires that a meaningful hearing be available after deprivation. Id.
at 541.

51. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540-41.
52. Id.at 541.

53. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).

54. Id. at 424.

55. Id. at 426.
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predeprivation hearing, the Parrattholding did not apply and a due
56
process violation had been alleged.
Thus, Parrattlimits section 1983 actions by limiting claims of
deprivation of property without due process of law, at least where
the claim evolves from the negligent and unauthorized act of a state
official. Parratt also raised issues about other ways of limiting fourteenth amendment due process claims brought under section 1983.1 7
For example, the Court in Parratt did not address whether a postdeprivation hearing would satisfy due process when one's property
is intentionally deprived by an unauthorized act; when life or liberty
is negligently deprived by an unauthorized act; or when life or liberty
is intentionally deprived by an unauthorized act. 8
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS

Section 1983 is not limited to procedural due process claims, but
includes all constitutional violations.5 9 The number of recognized constitutional claims under section 1983 has been increasing as more of
the Bill of Rights is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and
held to apply to the states.6 The Court in Monroe v. Pape followed
this trend when it addressed the issue whether fourth amendment violations could be redressed through a section 1983 action.'
In Monroe, thirteen Chicago police officers allegedly broke into
the petitioners' home early one morning without a search warrant
and dragged them out of bed. 62 The complaint also alleged that the
police made the petitioners stand naked in the living room while the
police ransacked the house, and that one of them was taken to the
police station and detained for ten hours without being charged with
a crime." The petitioners filed suit in federal district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,64 28 U.S.C. § 1343,65 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331,6 seeking
56. Id.at 435-36.
57. See Friedman, supra note 44, at 572-77.
58. Id.
59. See supra note 25.
60. See Defining the Parameters,supra note 30, at 1219 n.5. For a comprehensive list of federal constitutional rights the fourteenth amendment now protects against
state interference, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 567-68
(1978).
61. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
62. Id.at 169.
63. Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. 1984) provides: "The district courts shall have
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damages and naming the thirteen officers and the City of Chicago
as defendants. 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that since the fourth amendment was applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the statutory requirement of section 1983
that the complaint allege facts constituting the deprivation of a right
under the fourteenth amendment had been satisfied.68 Thus, the Court
opened the door for suits in federal court against state officials alleging violations of substantive constitutional rights which were incor69
porated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
C.

FOURTH AMENDMENT "SEARCHES"

A threshold issue in fourth amendment analysis is has there been
a "search" of the kind described in the fourth amendment. 7" Early
cases examined this issue from the viewpoint of the place being intruded upon by the authorities, holding that a constitutionally protected area must be intruded before the fourth amendment is
triggered." This focus on protected areas was rejected in Katz v. United
States,7 2 when the Court held that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." 3 In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan established the test now used to determine whether a "search" has taken
place requiring government officials to follow the prescriptions of the
fourth amendment: "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy

original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States."
67. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169-70.
68. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171. The district court had dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action, and the court of appeals had affirmed. Id.
at 170. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Violation
of fourth amendment by federal agents is grounds for a federal cause of action.).
69. "Monroe established that relief under § 1983 could be obtained by individuals deprived of their rights by a state officer acting under color of state authority
or law, regardless of the officer's actual authority to engage in the acts complained
of." GOBERTAND & COHEN, supra note 36, at 67.
70. See e.g., W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.2 (1984).
71. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (evidence obtained by planting a "spike mike" in a wall adjoining defendant's house and an empty house was
excludable because federal authorities intruded upon a "constitutionally protected
area."). Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (wiretap of defendant's
telephone through wires outside the defendant's house held to be constitutional).
72. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
73. Id.at 351.
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and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 4
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test originally was
held to require a case-by-case approach to the "search" issue and
to mean that all government intrusions into private interests trigger
some degree of fourth amendment protection. 75 However, the Court
has retreated from this position by focusing more on the objective
question of what society recognizes as reasonable.7" In some recent
cases the Court has reverted to the pre-Katz categorical approach of
focusing on the place where the defendant is seeking constitutional
protections, resulting in the creation of bright line rules.7 7 Hudson
v. Palmer is one such case.7 8
74. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For cases applying the Katz test, see
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
n.12 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
9 (1968); Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
75. "In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to
make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of the exigencies of the case,
a central element in the analysis of reasonableness." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

17-18 n.15 (1968). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,

58 MINN. L. REV. 349, (1974):
The question of what constitutes a covered "search" or "seizure" would
and should be viewed with an appreciation that to exclude any particular
police activity from coverage is essentially to exclude it from judicial control and from the command of reasonableness, whereas to include it is to
do no more than say that it must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
Id. at 393.
76. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979). In holding that police
monitoring of telephone numbers dialed from a private telephone did not amount
to a fourth amendment search, the Court in Smith rejected Smith's claims that he
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers or that such an expectation
was reasonable. Id. at 742-43 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("[Olur
problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular
situations may be ....

Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz,

is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable' . . .. ).
77. See Hudson, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (fourth amendment "has no applicability to
a prison cell"); Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) (fourth amendment
does not extend to "open fields"); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
(Use of electronic surveillance to track a container in defendant's automobile did
not constitute a fourth amendment search.). But see United States v. Karo, 104 S.
Ct. 3296 (1984) (Monitoring of electronic "beeper" after it was taken into defendant's house constituted a fourth amendment search.).
78. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3194.
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D.

FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION IN PRISONS

While the Supreme Court until recent years has afforded the
average citizen a great deal of protection under the fourth
amendment, 79 fourth amendment protection in the prison context has
not been forthcoming." The reluctance of the Court to extend fourth
amendment protection to prisoners was first suggested in Stroud v.
United States8 ' and later amplified in Lanza v. New York.8" In Stroud,
an inmate was convicted of murdering a guard. 3 The inmate appealed
his conviction, alleging that letters he had written which were used
as evidence at trial were illegally seized from him in violation of his
fourth amendment rights and should have been suppressed at the trial.8
In holding that the rule excluding evidence obtained through an
illegal search or seizure85 did not apply to the letters seized from the
inmate, the Court reasoned that because the letters "came into possession" of the prison officials in accordance with an established practice which was intended to promote the discipline of the prison, the
fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures had not been violated.8 6 The Court, however, did not describe
the established practice and how it promoted prison discipline.87 This
concept of established practice, though here incomplete, was more
fully developed by later courts as a balancing factor in the objective
prong of the Katz analysis-if the prisoner has exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy, then it must be an expectation that society,
in light of established prison practices justified by security or other
important penological needs, is willing to recognize as reasonable. 88
79. See supra note 74. See also United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984)
(rule excluding illegally obtained evidence at trial not applicable if officers reasonably
relied on a warrant issued by a magistrate); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983)
(determining if probable cause exists to believe contraband or evidence is located
at a particular place must be done based on totality of circumstances).
80. See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 10.9 at 396-420 (1978), and
at 169-75 (Supp. 1984); Gianelli & Gilligan, supra note 13, at 1046.
81. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
82. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
83. Stroud, 251 U.S. at 16.
84. Id.at 21-22.
85. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), an early fourth amendment case, the Court left convicted persons outside the protection of the fourth and fifth amendments: "[The fourth and
fifth amendments protect] the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by
his conviction of some public offense . . . ." Id. at 630.
86. Stroud, 251 U.S. at 21-22.

87. Id.at 15.
88. See infra note 96.
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The inmate in Lanza had been paroled, but was convicted for
refusing to answer questions to a legislative committee which was investigating the questionable circumstances of his parole. The inmate appealed his conviction on the grounds that the committee had asked
him questions with the aid of a transcript of a conversation held between the inmate and a visitor while he was still in prison. 9 The Court
upheld the conviction, finding that since the questions asked by the
committee were not dependent upon the intercepted conversation, the
constitutional issue did not need to be decided. 90
In doing so, the Court added some controversial dicta to which
three justices objected. 9' The Court found a "novel argument" in
comparing a jailhouse to a man's house as a place where the fourth
amendment provides constitutional immunity. 92 Applying the traditional "protected areas" analysis, the Court said "it is obvious a jail
shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile,
an office, or a hotel room. In prison, surveillance has traditionally
been the order of the day." 93
Two factors work against the condemning statements made in
Lanza about the fourth amendment in a prison cell. First, the
statements are dicta and were not necessary to decide the issue of
the case. 94 Second, Lanza was decided before the Katz test was enunciated. Therefore, the dicta in Lanza should have been effectively overruled because the Court therein determined the fourth amendment
protection issue by examining the place where the alleged intrusion
occurred, rather than by analyzing whether the person making the
claim has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched
or the object seized. 95 The lower federal courts have ignored Lanza
89. Lanza, 370 U.S. at 139-40.
90. Id.at 146-47.
91. Chief Justice Warren wrote a memorandum opinion, Id. at 147-50, and
with Justice Douglas joined an opinion written by Justice Brennan, Id. at 150-53.
Neither opinion was characterized as a concurrence or a dissent. Justice Brennan
began: "I must protest the Court's gratuitous exposition of several grave constitutional issues confessedly not before us for decision in this case." Id. at 150 (opinion
of Brennan, J.). The Chief Justice predicted that "[s]uch dicta, when written into
our decisions, have an unfortunate way of turning up in digests and decisions of
lower courts; they are often quoted as evidencing the considered opinion of this Court,
and this is so even though such intention is denied by the writer." Id. at 148 (opinion of Warren, C.J.). The Hudson Court then quoted the dicta to support its reasoning. See Hudson 104 S. Ct. at 3199 n.6, 3201.
92. Lanza, 370 U.S. at 143. This case was decided before Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
93. Lanza, 370 U.S. at 143.
94. Id.at 139.
95. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("The Fourth Amend-
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and used the Katz analysis to conclude that prisoners do have some
minimum expectation of privacy in prison, and the reasonableness
of the search in light of that diminished fourth amendment protection depends on the nature of the intrusion and the societal interest
of whether an established practice which serves an institutional pur9 6

pose is involved.

ment protects people, not places."). See also supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
96. For federal court cases in order of the circuits see United States v.
Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982) (Inmate's
residuum of fourth amendment protection was not violated by warrantless search
of cell when inmate had been charged with sending a bomb in the mail.); Hodges
v. Stanley, 712 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983) (A predetention strip search of inmate conducted immediately after another strip search was held to be unnecessary and grounds
for a valid claim of fourth amendment violation.); DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698 F.2d
602 (2d Cir. 1983) (The seizure of inmate's diary, which contained accounts about
a recent riot, was held to be reasonable, given the security needs, and not a violation
of inmate's fourth amendment rights.); Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Even legitimate institutional purposes of a rectal search rule cannot justify violating
fundamental liberties if a more narrowly drawn means can be achieved to accomplish
the purpose.); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Denial
of any fourth amendment protection to a prisoner potentially would subject him
to any form of search and seizure, no matter how abusive or intrusive .... provided
only that the search and seizure do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment."); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
932 (1975) ("We hold that a prisoner enjoys the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable seizures, at least to some minimal extent .... Bonner
...stated that a Fourth Amendment claim with respect to the seizure of his state
court transcript."); Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1984) (Balancing inmate's reduced fourth amendment rights against security needs, search and temporary
seizure of personal property was justified under exigent circumstances of a purported
escape plan.); United States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1978) (Routine search
conducted according to procedure which resulted in seizure of papers later used to
convict inmate of tax fraud did not violate inmate's minimum fourth amendment
rights.); United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 904
(1981). (A prison inmate has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a sealed letter
seized from his cell during a search conducted after officials heard a tip of an escape
plan.); United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
855 (1975) (Justifiable prison rules forbidding communication between prisoners and
confiscation of a note in violation of those rules did not violate inmate's limited
fourth amendment rights.); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1974) (Inmate
whose property was confiscated when he was placed in maximum security cell but
who received only half of his property back upon his release stated a valid claim
of fourth amendment violation.); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974) (Absent showing of justifiable prison security purpose, interception and copying of inmate's letter violated fourth amendment.);
Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973)
(Rectal searches were permitted if conducted "under judicious circumstances" and
if the searches were not intended to humiliate or degrade prisoners); United States
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not forgotten the dicta from

Lanza. In Bell v. Wolfish,9 7 the Court cited Lanza for the proposi-

tion that a prisoner might not have any reasonable expectation of
privacy in his cell. 98 This proposition was dicta, too, as the Court
assumed arguendo that prisoners did retain some diminished expecta-

tion of privacy and held that a prison policy of conducting unannounced, irregular searches of cells, known as "shakedowns," did

not infringe on the inmates' fourth amendment interest in privacy. 99
The Court reasoned that the legitimate security purposes for the search
policy in question rendered it legitimate.' °° The Court did recognize
that the prisoners' diminished expectation of privacy protected them
against some abusive searches.' "The [strip and body cavity] searches
must be conducted in a reasonable manner."'0 2 This residuum of fourth

amendment privacy interest, which protects prisoners only from abusive
searches that are intended to harass and humiliate, came under attack and was diminished further in Hudson v. Palmer. °3

v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553 (1lth Cir. 1983) (The use of photocopy of a letter, written
by inmate, as evidence in his murder trial was held to be legitimate and was not
violative of inmate's limited fourth amendment rights, given the legitimate penological
needs involved in seizure of the letter by prison officials.); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (The use of notes, seized by guards from Hinckley's cell, as evidence at his trial was held to be a fourth amendment violation
because the seizure was not according to established practice or policy showing necessity of seizure to maintain security).
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Hudson noted that although a second circuit and
ninth circuit case hold contrary to the above string of cases, these two cases were
decided at a time when "many courts thought no judicial review of prison conditions was possible." Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3213 n.19. See United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973) (Search
of inmate's cell and seizure of information alter used to convict inmate for tax fraud
did not violate fourth amendment because it is not reasonable for a prisoner to consider his cell private.); Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972) (Inmate
had no right of privacy violated when prison officials monitored a conversation with
a visitor.).
97. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
98. "It may well be argued that a person confined in a detention facility has
no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell and that therefore
the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a person." Id. at 556-57.
99. Id. at 557.
100. Id. The Court also upheld a policy of conducting anal and strip searches
of prisoners after they visited with persons outside the prison. Id. at 558.
101. Id. at 560 (Body cavity searches intended to be abusive will not be condoned under the fourth amendment.).
102. Id.
103. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984); See infra notes 104-173 and accompanying text.
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III.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF HUDSON V. PALMER

FACTS OF THE CASES

Russell Palmer, Jr. was an inmate in the Bland Correctional
Center in Bland, Virginia." °" On September 16, 1981, Officer Ted
Hudson' 5 and a fellow prison guard conducted a "shakedown" search
of Palmer's locker and cell. 0' During this search, Hudson found a
ripped pillowcase in a waste can in the cell, near Palmer's bunk.0 7
Hudson then instituted charges against Palmer for destroying state
property.' 0 After a prison hearing, he was found guilty and ordered
to reimburse the state for the destroyed pillowcase. A reprimand was
then entered into his permanent file.' 9
As a result of these events, Palmer instituted a pro se complaint
against Hudson alleging that Hudson had conducted the search and
brought false charges against him as a means of harassment," ' and
that Hudson had intentionally destroyed some of Palmer's noncontraband property,"' thereby violating his fourteenth amendment
right not to be deprived of property without due process of law." 2
104. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3196. Palmer was serving sentences for forgery,
uttering, grand larceny and bank robbery convictions. Id.
105. Ted Hudson was the petitioner in the case. In the companion case involving the issue whether an intentional deprivation of property violated Palmer's fourteenth amendment right to due process of law, Palmer was the petitioner. Id. at 3194.
106. Id. at 3196. The Supreme Court reports the search as a "shakedown search."
Id. The court of appeals reports the search as a "nonroutine shakedown search."
Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1221 (4th Cir. 1983), modified, 104 S. Ct. 3194
(1984). The Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555 (1979) described a
"shakedown" search as follows: "The MCC staff conducts unannounced searches
of inmate living areas at irregular intervals. These searches generally are formal unit
'shakedowns' during which all inmates are cleared of the residential units, and a
team of guards searches each room." Nothing in the record of Hudson indicates
that any prisoner other than Palmer was involved in the search in question. Hudson,
104 S. Ct. at 3194.
107. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3196.
108. Id.
109. Id.

110. In his original complaint, Palmer alleged that Hudson also came back the
next day, "again harassed me trying to force me into saying something smart to
him or going off on him." Palmer also claimed that fellow inmates witnessed the
alleged harassment. Brief for Respondent at 8, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194
(1984).

111. Palmer claimed that Hudson "shook down my locker and destroyed a lot
of my property, i.e.: legal materials, letters and other personal property only as a
means of harassment." Brief for Respondent at 7, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct.
3194 (1984).
112. Palmer brought the action under the Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

[1985:2711

HUDSON V. PALMER

Denying the allegations, Hudson moved for summary judgment." 3
The district court granted summary judgment to Hudson on all
counts.'"
B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the granting of summary judgment on the due process claim.', In extending
the holding of Parratt v. Taylor to intentional acts, the court relied
on what it determined to be the "underlying principle" of the
Parrattopinion: "[W]hen no practical way to provide a predeprivation hearing exists, a post-deprivation hearing will satisfy the dictates
of procedural due process ..... ""I The court reasoned that if predeprivation process is impracticable to provide for deprivations involving unauthorized and random negligent acts, then predeprivation
process must be impracticable to provide for deprivations involving
unauthorized and random intentional acts as well."' The principle
applies to both levels of conduct.'
(1982). Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3197.
113. Id.
114. Id. In an unreported opinion, the district court examined three allegations
made by Palmer: that Hudson destroyed his non-contraband, personal property, that
Hudson brought false charges against him, and that Hudson had engaged in a pattern of harassment against him. Relying on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
the court dismissed the first count for failing to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The court construed Parrattto mean that whenever a state provides a plaintiff with
a remedy to redress a property loss suffered at the hands of the state, due process
has been satisfied. The false charges claim was dismissed because the court determined that it could not overturn findings of fact determined at the prison disciplinary
hearing. Finally, the court dismissed the harassment claim: "While there is no doubt
that in extreme cases of harassment and improper treatment a claim of cruel and
unusual punishment ... may be stated ... the court does not feel that the allegations made in this case, even if taken as true, rise to the level of a constitutional
deprivation." Palmer v. Hudson, No. 81-0290-A at 4-5 (W.D. Va. Nov. 18, 1981)
(citation omitted).
115. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1983), modified, 104 S. Ct.
3194 (1984).
116. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
117. Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d at 1222.
118. Id.
119. Id.at 1223. Other lower courts were split over the issue of extending Parratt
to intentional acts. For those cases extending Parratt to authorized and unauthorized
intentional acts, see Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1982) (Authorized and intentional eviction of striking guards from living quarters without notice
or predeprivation hearing did not violate due process.); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd.
of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.,
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The court reversed the granting of summary judgment on the
harassment claim,2' finding that a genuine issue of fact existed as
to whether Hudson's search was routine or conducted to harass,
2
thereby precluding summary judgment.' ' This factual issue precluded
summary judgment, the court reasoned, "unless it can be concluded
22 Having never
that Palmer had no privacy interest in the locker."'
considered the issue before, the court followed the jurisprudence
developed in other circuits to conclude that a prisoner does retain
a limited interest in privacy protecting him from "unreasonable searches
and unjustifiable confiscations" of non-contraband personal
property.' 3 The court relied on the principle that constitutional rights
of prisoners should not be deprived unless they interfere with prison
security or administration.' 24
Based upon this principle, the court developed a standard of
review that allowed great deference to prison administration. Noting
that Bell v. Wolfish already permitted "shakedown" searches of blocks
of cells, the court said it would permit similar searches of individual
cells under two circumstances:
[Ijndividual shakedown searches, such as that here, may legitimately
be grounded upon either a prison policy of conducting random
searches of single cells or blocks of cells to deter or discover the
Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983). (Unauthorized and intentional assault, battery,
demotion, harassment, and revocation of scholarship of a college football player
by coach and trainer of team without a hearing did not violate due process.); But
see Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unauthorized, intentional deprivation of liberty caused by false arrest violated due process.); Weiss v.
Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983)
(Unauthorized, intentional deprivation of plaintiff's mining equipment by a forest
service employee stated a valid due process violation.); Madyun v. Thompson, 657
F. 2d 868 (7th Cir. 1981) (Allegations by prisoners that authorities intentionally cut
federal work funds for prisoners stated a valid due process claim.).
120. Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1223. The court rephrased the harassment claim, callId.
ing it a claim of "an unreasonable search of [Palmer's] property.
121. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
122. Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1223.
123. Id. The court found "numerous other courts have held that prisoners have
a limited privacy interest and should be free from unreasonable searches and unjustifiable confiscations." Id. at 1223-24 (citing United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d
115, 129-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1244-47 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 832 (8th Cir. 1977); Sostre v.
Preiser, 519 F.2d 763, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1975); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311,
1315-17 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); United States v. Savage,
482 F.2d 1371, 1372 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1973); Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973)). See supra note 96.
124. Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1224.
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possession of contraband, or upon the existence of some reasonable
basis for a belief that the prisoner possesses contraband. 25
If either justification could be proven by prison officials, then the
search would be valid unless sufficient "direct" proof was ,presented
that the search was intended to harass or humiliate the prisoner. '26
Since there was conflicting evidence as to the purpose of the search,
the court reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary

determination.

27

IV.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

All nine members of the Court agreed that the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment had been met.' 28 In an opinion
written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that an unauthorized and intentional deprivation by a state employee does not
violate due process if adequate post-deprivation remedies were available
to the person whose property was confiscated.' 2 9 The Court reasoned
that Hudson's random and unauthorized act made predeprivation process by the state impossible and that adequate state law remedies were
30
available to Palmer.'
In extending the Parrattrationale to intentional deprivations the
Court could "discern no logical distinction between negligent and intentional deprivations of property insofar as the 'practicability' of affording predeprivation process is concerned. The state can no more
anticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar
negligent conduct." ' The Court argued that intentional acts might
be even harder to anticipate because the perpetrator could try to con32
ceal intent.'
Four members of the Court, joining Justice Stevens, concurred
with the due process portion of the opinion with reservations:
I do not understand the Court's holding to apply to conduct that
125. Id.

126.
127.
128.
129.
vide for
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1225.
Id.
Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3204.
"The controlling inquiry is solely whether the state is in a position to propredeprivation process." Id. at 3204.
Id.
Id. at 3203.
Id.
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violates a substantive constitutional right-actions governmental officials may not take no matter what procedural protections accompany
them . . or to cases in which it is contended that the established
prison procedures themselves create an unreasonable risk that
prisoners will be unjustifiably deprived of their property. ...133

The Court was divided five to four on the fourth amendment
issue. 134 The petitioner urged the Court to adopt a "bright line" rule
that prisoners have no fourth amendment protection in their cells
because they have no legitimate expectation of privacy in a prison
cell. 13' The majority obliged, holding in an opinion written by the
Chief Justice that the search of Palmer's prison cell locker was not
a fourth amendment search entitling him to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 136
On the fourth amendment issue the Court first stated its repeated
position of providing to prisoners those constitutional rights which
are not inconsistent with imprisonment or with the "objectives of
incarceration."' 37 After listing some of the rights held by prisoners
' the Chief Justice pointed out
and cases supporting those rights, 38
that many significant rights are either curtailed or lost altogether when
one becomes a prison inmate.' 39 Without stating out which rights
are curtailed or lost, ' the Court offered two justifications for cur133. Id. at 3208 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion was joined by Justices White,
Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion.
Id. at 3205 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
joined in the concurrence and dissent written by Justice Stevens. Id. at 3207 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 3198.
136. Id. at 3200.
137. Id. at 3198.

138. The court lists as prisoners' rights the right to be free from invidious racial

discrimination, Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); the right to petition the
government for redress of their grievances, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
the right to exercise religious freedom, Cruz v. Beto. 405 U.S. 319 (1972); a limited
right of free speech, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); the right to due process,
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); and the right not to be subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1975). Hudson, 104 S.

Ct. at 3198-99.
139. Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3199. The Court did cite other cases for the general

proposition that lawful imprisonment curtailed some rights. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 545-46 (1979); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
140. The Court never gave specific examples of rights limited in the penal system,
but the cases it cited did. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 555 (first amendment rights limited in prisons); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. at 285-86 (the "otherwise unqualified right" to appear personally in court to argue one's case limited
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tailing or abrogating those rights. The first was a desire to accommodate the needs and objectives of prison facilities, "chief among which

is internal security."" The other justification was that restricting and

retracting prisoners' rights served as incidental reminders that "under
our system of justice,4 2deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction."'

In order to determine whether the fourth amendment applied

within a prison cell,' 3 the Court applied the Katz test to determine
"if a 'justifiable' expectation of privacy is at stake.'" The objective,
not subjective, analysis of a prisoner's expectation of privacy was
stressed as being of "controlling importance;"'' 4 5 but a subjective expectation of privacy in the inmate's cell seems to have been assumed
for the sake of argument.' 4 6 The Court then adopted a bright line
rule that the "Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable
4 7
searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.'

Several justifications were given for this holding. First, the Court

said privacy rights in a prison cell can never be reconciled with prison
needs and objectives.'"4 Citing statistics on prison violence, the Court

reasoned that prisoners in general have shown antisocial and often

violent tendencies, cannot conform to the standards of behavior set
by society, and often cannot respect the rights of others.'4 9 Because
in prison). No previous case has given specific examples of rights which are completely withdrawn in prison.
141. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3199 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)).
142. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3199.
143. The Court acknowledged that it had never determined if the fourth amendment applied to a prison cell, but explained that the basis for inquiry had been
established. Id.
144. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). Actually, the Court
enunciated this test in two other ways. One was "whether 'the person invoking its
protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy
that has been invaded by government action."' Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3199 (quoting
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). The other test enunciated was "whether
a prisoner's expectation of privacy in his prison cell is the kind of expectation that
'society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."' Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3199 (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1967)).
145. Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3199 n.7 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 768, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1971)).
146. "[W]e hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell ... "
Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200 (emphasis added).
147. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
148. Id.
149. Id. The Court listed the following statistics on prison violence:
During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 prisoners
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of this, prison officials "are to take all the necessary steps" to ensure that the prison environment remains safe and sanitary for
prisoners, visitors and prison officials. '
The "monumental tasks" faced by prison officials, especially the
safety objective, simply cannot be accomplished, in the Court's eyes,
if prisoners retain any right of privacy in their prison cells. 5 ' The
safety objective could not be accomplished because the prison cell
is the primary place where an inmate can hide dangerous weapons
and contraband, and to allow any privacy rights in the cell would
mean hampering the "unfettered access" of prison officials to search
for such things.' 52
In its second justification the Court analyzed the interests at stake
and applied a balancing test to determine the legitimacy of Palmer's
expectation of privacy. The Court balanced the interest of prisoners
in having a legitimate expectation of privacy in their prison cells against
society's interest in having safe and secure penal institutions.' In
finding that society's interest always outweighs the prisoner's interest,' 5
two conclusions were set forth. Quoting the dicta from Lanza v. New
York that a prison 'shares none of the attributes of privacy of a
home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room,""" the Court concluded that the prisoner's interest is lessened by the "exigencies of
the circumstances" of prison life.' 56 Also, society's interest was increased by the Court's view that a prisoner's right of privacy is "fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of
inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security. . . "'57
murdered by fellow inmates in state and federal prisons. A number of prison
personnel were murdered by prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or
similar disturbances were reported in these facilities for the same time frame.
And there were over 125 suicides in these institutions .... Additionally,
informal statistics from the U.S. Bureau of Prisons show that in the federal
system during 1983, there were 11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults
on other inmates, 227 inmate assaults on prison staff, and 10 suicides.
Id. The dissent noted that the homicide rate in some large cities in the United States
is greater than that in prisons. Id. at 3214 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. Id. at 3200.
151. Id. The court quoted Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974), for
the proposition that the administration of a prison is "'at best an extraordinarily
difficult undertaking."' Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 3201.
155. Id. (quoting Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962)).
156. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201.
157. Id.
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Finally, the Court noted that the court of appeals' approach of
requiring an established plan of random searches would "seriously
undermine" the goal of prison security by taking away the weapon
of surprise: "It is simply naive to believe that prisoners would not
eventually decipher any plan officials might devise for 'planned random searches."" 5 8
In a footnote the Court also dismissed Palmer's claim that destruction of of his property was an unreasonable seizure which violated
the fourth amendment: "[T]he same reasons that lead us to conclude
that the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable
searches is inapplicable in a prison cell, apply with controlling force
to seizures. Prison officials must be free to seize from, cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate institutional interests."' 59
Having concluded that prisoners have no legitimate expectation
of privacy in their cells and that Palmer could not invoke the fourth
amendment as a redress for his harassment claim, the Court stated
that such harassment still will not be tolerated.' 60 To redress harassment by prison officials, the Court reasoned, Palmer and other inmates
can take advantage of other legal remedies. The Court suggested seeking redress through state tort and common law or through the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.' 6 '
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion elaborating her views
on why she thought Palmer did not state a "ripe" constitutional
claim.' 6 2 She agreed with the majority that any search and seizure
of property from a prison cell is per se reasonable.' 6 3 In taking notice
that in most circumstances the determination of whether a fourth
amendment search or seizure has taken place is made on a case-bycase basis,' 64 Justice O'Connor argued that some circumstances require
a categorical determination of the search issue. She then determined
that Palmer's situation is an appropriate circumstance for such treatment, given the government's "compelling interest in prison safety"
and the "necessarily ad hoc judgments required of prison
officials ....
Since all searches and seizure in prison cells are reasonable, any
loss or destruction of property seized is no longer a fourth amendment
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 3201 n.8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 3201.
Id. at 3202.
Id. at 3205-06.
Id.
Id. at 3206 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.15 (1968)).
Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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issue. Justice O'Connor reasoned that property interests are not protected by the fourth amendment beyond the right to be protected
against unreasonable searches and seizures.' 66 She compared the
destruction of Palmer's property to destruction of property during
inventory searches and seizures conducted when a person is arrested
and detained by police.' 67 The security reasons for such searches and
seizures, Justice O'Connor concluded, are similar to the reasons for
prison searches, and loss or destruction of property after inventory
searches and seizures "has not . . . ever been thought to state a Fourth
Amendment claim."'

68

In a strongly worded dissent, 69 Justice Stevens argued that even
if Palmer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the property
in question, he still should have fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures of property which he was legally
entitled to possess.' 0 This conclusion stemmed from a disagreement
166. Id. at 3206 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor reasoned that
"if the act of taking possession and the indefinite retention of the property are
themselves reasonable, the handling of property while in the government's custody
is not itself of Fourth Amendment concern. The nonprivacy interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment do not extend beyond the right against unreasonable dispossessions." Id.
167. Id. at 3207 (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983)); United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974)).
168. Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3207 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The reasons stated
for searches and seizures in arrest and detention contexts are not only to maintain
the security of the detention facility, but also to protect the detainee's property. Id.
169. Personal letters, snapshots of family members, a souvenir, a deck of
cards, a hobby kit, perhaps a diary or a training manual for an apprentice
in a new trade, or even a Bible-a variety of inexpensive items may enable
a prisoner to maintain contact with some part of his past and an eye to
the possibility of a better future. Are all of these items subject to unrestrained
perusal, confiscation or mutilation at the hands of a possibly hostile guard?
Is the Court correct in its perception that "society" is not prepared to
recognize any privacy or possessory interest of the prison inmate-no matter
how remote the threat to prison security may be?
Id. at 3208 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in
original). Justice Stevens set the tone of his attack by quoting the Chief Justice from
an earlier opinion, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), where the Chief
Justice said that " '[i]nmates ... retain certain fundamental rights of privacy; they

are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed at will by the public
or by media reporters ....

..

Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3208 (quoting Houchins v.

KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978)).
170. Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3209-10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In a footnote, Justice Stevens stressed that he does not agree with the
majority's bright line approach:
Though I am willing to assume that for purposes of this case the Court's
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with Justice O'Connor over the extent of the fourth amendment's
protection. Justice Stevens contended that Palmer's possessory interests
in his property were protected by the fourth amendment "apart from
whatever privacy interest he may have in it."' 7 ' Given this conclusion, and taking Palmer's assertions as true, Justice Stevens reasoned
that the seizure and destruction of Palmer's property were unreasonable
and violated the fourth amendment because there was no penological
objective for Hudson's acts and because intentional harassment of
inmates by guards is concededly intolerable.'7 2
Stevens criticized what he saw as a decision based on "the perception of the four Justices who have joined the opinion that THE CHIEF
JUSTICE has authored," arguing that nearly every court and commentator addressing the issue has concluded that prisoners retain some
fourth amendment right in a prison cell, and that even prison ad3
ministrators do not condone harassing prisoners.'
B.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

In reading the fourth amendment out of a prisoner's cell the Court
took some analytical and legal steps that deserve criticism. Not only
did the Court ignore precedent, but it also relied heavily on pre-Katz
holding concerning most of Palmer's privacy interests is correct, that should
not be taken as an endorsement of the Court's new "bright line" rule that
a prisoner can have no expectation of privacy in his papers or effects....
I cannot see any justification for applying this rule to minimum security
facilities in which inmates who pose no realistic threat to security are housed.
I also see no justification for reading the mail of a prisoner once it has
cleared whatever censorship mechanism is employed by the prison and has
been received by the prisoner.
Id. at 3209 n.5.
171. "[A fourth amendment] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property."
Id. at 3209 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984)).
172. Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3208-09. "Is the Court correct in its perception
that 'society' is not prepared to recognize any privacy or possessory interest of the
prison inmate-no matter how remote the threat to prison security may be?" Id.
at 3208 (emphasis in original).
Stevens argued that the allegations must be taken as true because the case came
before the Court on the pleadings, citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980)
(per curiam); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
515-16 (1972); Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chemical Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 174-75 (1965); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). Hudson,
104 S.Ct. at 3207-08.
173. Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3212-13 (emphasis in original). See infra note 174
and accompanying text.
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dicta to conclude that a prisoner has no expectation of privacy in
a prison cell. The Court also failed to distinguish between legitimacy
of search and legitimacy of seizure. Finally, although the Court might
have properly extended Parratt to unauthorized, intentional deprivations of property, it failed to realize that its fourth amendment holding
authorized the guard's action, making the deprivation of property here
a violation of due process under Logan v. Zimmerman Brush. Each
of these points will be examined in detail.
First, the Court in Hudson casts aside substantial case law to

reach its decision barring the fourth amendment from a prisoner's
cell. The fact that every federal court of appeals to confront the issue
had held that a prisoner retains a limited expectation of privacy, so

long as it does not interfere with a security or other reasonable penal
interest, did not influence the Court."
An example of the type of analysis conducted by the circuits can
be found in the seventh circuit case of Bonner v. Coughlin.'7 5 The
facts in Bonner are nearly identical to the facts in Hudson; during
the course of a shakedown search of an inmate's cell, the inmate's
trial transcript was allegedly taken by a guard.' 7 6 In holding that the
174. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3212-13 n.19. See supra note 96. The Court
acknowledged that courts of appeals have held that a prisoner retains some fourth
amendment protection in his cell. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3198 n.5. Commentators have
agreed with the approach of the courts of appeals. Professor LaFave has written:
[Wihen a search is directed only at one or a very few prisoners and is not
part of a more general inspection, it would seem necessary to show some
kind of justification upon an individual basis. This is because if the prisoner
is to receive even minimal Fourth Amendment protection, then it must be
established that the search was undertaken as a reasonable means of maintaining order and discipline rather than "for the purpose of harassing or
humiliating the inmate."
W. LAFAVE, supra note 15 at 402. Other commentators have agreed:
[Tihere is a societal interest in bringing prison searches under fourth amendment regulation. As the Supreme Court recognized in Procunier v. Martinez, an important objective of a penal system is the "rehabilitation of
prisoners." Without the privacy and dignity provided by fourth amendment
coverage, an inmate's opportunity to reform, as small as it may be, will
further be diminished. It is anomalous to provide a prisoner with
rehabilitative programs and services in an effort to build self-respect while
simultaneously subjecting him to unjustified and degrading searches and
seizures.
GIANNELLI & GILLIGAN, supra note 13, at 1069 (footnotes omitted) (citing and quoting
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974)).
175. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
176. Id. at 1312-13. Inmate Bonner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981),
alleging that his transcript was taken during a search which violated his fourth amend-
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inmate had a legitimate, though limited, expectation of privacy with
respect to his cell, then Judge Stevens wrote that "[rjespect for the
77 This expecdignity of the individual compels" such a conclusion.
tation of privacy was enough to give rise to a fourth amendment claim
78
of unreasonable seizure of the inmate's trial transcript from his cell."
The court then shifted the burden to the prison officials to prove
the reasonableness of the seizure.1

79

After acknowledging the overwhelming mandate of the courts of
appeals and then casting it aside, the Court in Hudson relied to a
great extent on arguably unsound dicta from past cases to remove
the fourth amendment from a prison cell. For example, the Court
8°
quoted Lanza v. New York for the proposition that a prison 'shares
none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office,
or a hotel room."" ' 8 The Court acknowledged that three of the seven
judges deciding Lanza dissented from the 'gratuitous exposition of
several grave constitutional issues confessedly not before us . ... "'I"
Yet the Court ignored its own statement and relied on that language
8
83
to set forth a bright line rule.' The Court also cited Bell v. Wolfish'

as acknowledging the plausibility that a prisoner has no expectation
of privacy in his cell.' 5 Like the language from Lanza, the Bell
language was also dicta as the Court assumed for the purposes of

its holding that a prisoner retains a minimum expectation of privacy
in his cell.' 86

ment rights. Bonner also alleged that his due process rights and right of access to
the courts were interfered with. The record does not show an allegation of harassment, but Bonner's complaint alleges that upon returning from a work assignment,
he found his "cell door ajar and his personal belongings strewn on the floor." Other
inmates who saw the search claimed that the guard was seen leaving the cell with
a large envelope. Id. at 1312-13.
177. Id. at 1316.
178. Id. at 1317.
179. Id.
180. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
181. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201 (quoting Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. at
143). The Lanza Court also said, "to say that a public jail is the equivalent of a
man's 'house' or that it is a place where he can claim constitutional immunity from
search or seizure of his person, his papers, or his effects, is at best a novel argument." Lanza, 370 U.S. at 143.
182. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3199 n.6 (quoting Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
at 150 (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
183. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201.

184. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).

185. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537).
186. Bell, 441 U.S. at 557. "Assuming, arguendo, that a pretrial detainee retains such a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to a custodial facility,
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Third, the Court does not distinguish the legitimacy of the search
from the legitimacy of the seizure, instead arguing that because there
is no search for fourth amendment purposes, then there also is no
' As
seizure. 87
the dissent argues, "the Fourth Amendment protects
Palmer's possessory interests in his property entirely apart from
whatever privacy interest he may have in it." '88
During the same term in which Hudson was decided, the Court
decided United States v. Jacobsen,I 9 in which the issue was whether
a "seizure" in fourth amendment terms occurred when federal agents
destroyed a quantity of the defendant's white powder to test it for
drug content. 9 ' The Court held the destruction did constitute fourth
amendment seizure, but the seizure was reasonable, given the substantial government interest in uncovering illegal drugs and the de minimus
nature of the destruction.' 9 '
As in Jacobsen, the guard in Hudson "did affect respondents'
possessory interests protected by the [Fourth] Amendment, since by
destroying [the non-contraband property] it converted what had been
only a temporary deprivation of possessory interests into a permanent
one." '9 2 The difference with Hudson is that the seizure could not
have been reasonable since the guard had no substantial government
interest (i.e., security interest) in destroying Palmer's non-contraband,
legally possessed property.' 93
Finally, the Court's due process and fourth amendment holdings
are inconsistent with each other. Under the due process analysis, a
state employee who deprives a person of property through a random,
unauthorized act which is not according to established state procedure
is not violating the deprived person's due process rights if adequate
post-deprivation process is provided.' 9 Predeprivation process is said
we nonetheless find that the room-search rule does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id.
187. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201 n.8. "[T]he same reasons that lead us to conclude that the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches is
inapplicable in a prison cell, apply with controlling force to seizures. Prison officials
must be free to seize from cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate
institutional interests." Id.
188. Id. at 3209. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
189. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
190. Id.at 1661-63.
191. Id. at 1662-63.
192. Id. at 1662.
193. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3212 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
194. Id., at 3204-05.
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to be impractical to provide.' 95 However, the Court's interpretation

of the fourth amendment makes a prison guard's random searches
and seizures a proper practice to conduct. 96 The guard has the full
authority of the state to search when he sees fit.' 97 The guard's random
search and seizure routine becomes authorized established state practice,

for all practical purposes.

'
98

As a result, the guard is in a position,

given his authority and closeness to the situation, to practicably provide
a predeprivation hearing of some kind before carrying out the established state procedures, as required under Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush. "'
For example, consider the Court's determination that "[p]rison
officials must be free to seize from cells any articles which, in their
view, disserve legitimate institutional interests," 2 ° and apply it to the
facts of Hudson. Guard Hudson knew he was going to search Palmer's
cell. Established state practice (established by the Court) gave Hudson
the authority to conduct any searches he deemed necessary. Nothing
hindered him from providing to Palmer some sort of summary hearing,
say, a plea to the next higher authority before the search commenced.
He failed to provide a hearing and, in the process of searching Palmer's

cell, destroyed non-contraband property. Was not Palmer's right not

to be deprived of property without due process violated, given the
availability of a practical predeprivation hearing, the existence of

195. Id.
196. Id. at 3201 n.8. "Prison officials must be free to seize from cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate institutional interests."
197. Id. While the Court condones such latitude to prison officials, prison regulations probably do not. See infra note 220.
198. This state practice contention was articulated as follows by Palmer:
Because a guard bent on abusing his power will most likely not seek
predeprivation authority for the abuse and harassment, it might be argued
that a requirement of predeprivation process is as impracticable in such a
case as in the case of an accidental loss. However, this is not so. Because
an officer in such a situation can provide predeprivation process, then as
a matter of due process he must do so. If he declines, he acts at once unconstitutionally. The bad faith cannot be a factor allowed to render constitutional that which would be unconstitutional without it.
Brief for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner at 7-8, Hudson v. Palmer 104 S. Ct. 3194
(citation and footnotes ommitted).
199. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
200. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201 n.8. Simply allowing such great deference to
prison officials has been subject to criticism. Robertson, The Role of Ideology in
Prisoners' Rights Adjudication: Habilitative Prison Conditions and the Eighth A mendment, 4 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 271, 286 (1984) (footnote omitted) (advocating "judicial
oversight of prison officials") [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
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established state practice, and the authority vested in Hudson to carry
out that practice?2"'
C.

IMPLICATIONS

a.

General Impact-Other Remedies

The major implication of the Hudson decision is that a prison
inmate who has been harassed by a guard has a more restricted access
to the federal courts.20 2 Persons not in prison seeking redress on due
process grounds will find similar difficulties.20 3 Another result might
be that the Court has found two more ways to limit the increasing
number of civil rights cases filed in civil court.20 " In any event, a
prisoner who wishes to seek redress against a guard for destruction
of property or harassment has a number of other options available.
The inmate could sue under tort law in a state court, provided
the guard is not protected by sovereign immunity. 0 5 The inmate could

201. See Cross-Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4-5, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct.
at 3194. Palmer argued that "the act of an official which is made possible by virtue
of his position is the act of the state." Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Palmer argued
that fourteenth amendment protection is more important in the context of officials
acting in their day-to-day roles than in the context of state practice established by
legislative or administrative bodies because of the possibility of abuse. Id. at 5.
The majority of the Court in Hudson rejected the argument that Logan applied
to this case. The Court refused to recognize that any established state procedure
existed. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3204.
202. See Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3202.
203. Id. at 3204. The due process holding was not restricted to actions by
prisoners. Id.
204. In 1983 there were 17,687 civil rights petitions filed by state prison inmates, an 81.8 percent increase over the 9,730 petitions filed in 1978 and more than
eight times the number filed in 1970. 1983 AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR
127. See Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3215 n.30. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.). For a view by the Chief Justice that prisoner complaints should
be referred to administrative tribunals rather than handled by courts, see Burger,
The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Prisoner Complaint Caseload,
1975 Wis. L. REv. 523, 549-50 (1975). Consider R. KWARTLER, BEHIND BARs-PRIsONS
IN AMERICA 45 (1975) (explaining that courts have improved conditions and decreased
arbitrary decisionmaking over the last 15 years).
205. Virginia does not extend sovereign immunity to intentional torts committed
by state prison guards. See Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 19, 155 S.E.2d 369, 372-73
(1967) ("[A] state employee may be held liable for intentional torts.").
Most other states and the District of Columbia have either abolished or limited
sovereign immunity. See Note, Governmental Tort Immunity Revisited.: Ryan v. State,
25 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081-1082 n.12 (1983) ("Only Maryland appears to retain the doctrine" of sovereign immunity.); Note, Sovereign Immunity in Connecticut: Survey
and Economic Analysis, 13 CONN. L. REV. 293, 295 (1981) ("By 1978, forty-four
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institute an administrative hearing within the prison, and the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act might help in providing meaningful administrative hearings for state prisoners.2 "6 The Act has two
major provisions. First, it gives the United States Attorney General
authority to initiate suits or to intervene in section 1983 suits filed
by prisoners challenging the constitutionality or legality under federal
laws of state prison conditions or practices.2"" Also, the Act contains
a voluntary provision whereby states can adopt prisoner grievance procedures which, if certified by the United States Attorney General as
meeting minimum standards, prisoners must exhaust before filing section 1983 actions. 208 According to the legislative history, "[tihe effect
of [Section 1997] would be to secure basic legal and constitutional
rights for institutionalized persons, and to assist in relieving the caseloads of Federal courts in prisoner petitions." 2" 9 However, the Hudson
decision is contrary to the first stated congressional intent-rather than
"secure basic legal and constitutional rights" for prisoners, the Court
has taken away a prisoner's fourth amendment rights in his cell.
Theoretically, then, the act provides no protection for fourth amendment violations which occur in prisoners' cells, since the Court has
stated that such transgressions do not amount to constitutional
violations.
Finally, the inmate could claim a violation of the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. 2 0 This
2
could be successful, but only in the most egregious situations.. '
b.

Due Process Implications

If carried to its logical extreme, the Court's due process holdings
in Parrattand Hudson could mean that "section 1983 would be stripstates and the District of Columbia had totally or partially abolished sovereign immunity."). Illinois partially abolished sovereign immunity constitutionally: "Except
as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this state is
abolished." ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1980). After Palmer instituted his suit, Virginia adopted
an improved inmate grievance procedure which provides for limited damages to
prisoners whose property is lost. It was approved under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Brief
for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner at 11-12 n.12, Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a-1997c (1980).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1980).
209. H.R. REP. No. 897, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980).
210. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
211. See Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983) (Reckless failure to protect
an inmate from an obvious danger of assault is an eighth amendment violation which
may justify an award of punitive damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.); Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (Eighth amendment violations are punishments
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ped of much of its force." 21' 2 Professor Friedman has written that
to extend Parrattto intentional deprivations of life, liberty or property "overlooks the true basis for section 1983 actions: to serve as
a watchdog over abuses of power by state and local officers." 2 3' Nevertheless, Hudson has extended Parratt to intentional deprivations of

property, and lower courts are split on whether a post-deprivation

state remedy satisfies due process for negligent invasions of liberty

interests and intentional invasions of liberty interests. 2 Although the

Court in Parratt specifically stated that its holding did not extend
to deprivations of rights, privileges or immunities, such as those
guaranteed by the fourth and eight amendments,21 5 at least one lower
court has failed to limit the extension of Parratt and Hudson.2 16
which shock the conscience and are inconsistent with contemporary standards, but
double-ceiling of inmates and other harsh or restrictive conditions which did not
amount to wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain or punishment which is
disproportionate to the crime were not eighth amendment violations.); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Deliberate indifference by prison officials to "serious medical
needs of prisoners" violates eighth amendment, but negligent failure to properly
diagnose or treat a prisoner did not violate the amendment.).
212. See Friedman, supra note 44, at 547.
213. Id.at 573.
214. Compare Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1984)
(where there was a negligent deprivation of a liberty interest, post-deprivation state
court remedies satisfied due process and hence § 1983 claim in federal court was
dismissed); Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d 1472, 1478-81 (9th Cir. 1983) (adequate
state post-deprivation remedies satisfied due process where prison officials negligently
deprived inmate of liberty by detaining him in the prison four and one-half years
longer than his maximum sentence); and Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 514 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982) (where grandchildren were removed and
placed for adoption by local authorities, state court remedies satisfied due process
with respect to liberty interest); with Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 394-95 (5th
Cir. 1982) (possibility of state remedy to redress intentional deprivation of liberty
did not satisfy due process and § 1983 action was permissible).Cf Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (Post-deprivation state court remedy provided adequate
due process for student claiming intentional deprivation of liberty from corporal
punishment, but the holding was limited to the special nature of the school
environment.).
215. The Court emphasized that it was dealing with the "Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter," and not with some other right, privilege
or, immunity, such as those protected by the fourth and eighth amendments. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536.
216. See Coney v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199 (1lth Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Parratt
and Hudson extended to deny recovery under § 1983 for damages to property allegedly
caused by illegal seizure of a vehicle when adequate state tort remedies existed.).
But see Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1984) (Parrattand Hudson do
not extend to substantive constitutional violations in either negligent or intentional
contexts); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1983) (Parrattdoes not
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Finally, the issue remains as to who has the burden of proving the
adequacy of state remedies. One lower federal court has placed the

burden on the complainant to show that state remedies are not
17
adequate.'

c. Fourth Amendment Implications
The effect of Hudson on an inmate's fourth amendment rights

beyond his cell is not yet determinable. It appears that an inmate
still retains some expectation of privacy in his person to protect him

from unreasonable strip searches and body cavity searches.2 ' 8 It is
unclear whether all interceptions and inspections of a prisoner's incoming and outgoing mail are per se reasonable. The Court's decision
in Procunierv. Martinez permitted the reading and censoring of mail
if necessary to satisfy a substantial governmental interest, such as prison
security.2" 9 If a prisoner has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
his mail, though, as in his cell, then intercepting and inspecting mail
for any purpose would be reasonable under the fourth amendment.
Hudson appears to be in line with the Court's recent trend back
toward a policy of allowing great deference to prison officials when
addressing prisoner rights issues.22 An unanswered question, though,
is how prison administrators will react to the decision. It is not likely
that administrators will allow as a matter of practice such far-reaching
searches as the Court's decision allows under the fourth amendment,
for federal, state and model prison regulations forbid searches and
seizures in cells conducted merely to harass or humiliate the inmate.22 '
extend to a fourth amendment violation or to other substantive constitutional
violations.).
217. Marshall v. Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1984).
218. "The Court's repeal does appear to extend to less than the entire Amendment. It appears to limit its holding to a prisoner's 'papers and effects' located in
his cell. Apparently it believes that at least a prisoner's 'person' is secure from
unreasonable search and seizure." Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3216 n.31 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
560 (1979) (Abusive body cavity searches will not be condoned.).
219. 416 U.S. 396, 418-19 (1974).
220. For a listing of cases supporting this trend and articles commenting about
it, see Robertson, supra note 200, at 280 n.43. See also Block v. Rutherford, 104
S. Ct. 3227 (1984) (policy absolutely banning contact visits for pretrial detainees was
within deference of prison officials and did not violate fourteenth amendment).
221. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 553.10, 533.11 (1983) (prison staff may allow inmates
to possess enumerated items of clothing, special purchase items, legal materials, hobbycraft materials, radios and watches, correspondence and reading materials, and personal photos.); 28 C.F.R. § 552.13(b) (1983) (Staff conducting search of inmate's
cell and work area "shall leave the housing or work area as nearly as practicable
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Also, sociologists have found that prisoners who are deprived of all
sense of individuality are more prone to violence.22 2
It is, however, very clear that states, including Illinois, do not
have to follow the Hudson fourth amendment holding and can provide prisoners with greater protection from civil rights abuses through
state laws and constitutions.22 3 The Illinois constitution provides for
specific protection against "unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions
of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices
or other means." 22 More importantly for prisoners, the Illinois Unified
Corrections Code states that conviction and imprisonment do not entail
the loss of any civil rights, except the right to hold public office or
vote.225 Therefore, the fourth amendment holding in Hudson should
not substantially affect inmates in Illinois prisons.
Finally, the outcome of Hudson is not inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's trend in fourth amendment analysis. Recent decisions
in its original order."); Bonner v. Coughlin 517 F.2d 1311, 1314 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975)
(Illinois regulation provided for disciplinary action to prison staff who intentionally
damage, confiscate or abuse property which inmate was entitled to possess.); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 23-6.10(e) (1981) ("All searches of prisoner living
quarters and belongings should be conducted so as to minimize harm to prisoner
property and to minimize invasion of privacy.").
222. For a general discussion of the sociological problems in prisons, see Schwarz,
Deprivation of Privacy as a "Functional Prerequisite". The Case of the Prison, 63
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 229 (1972). In analyzing prisoner reaction to deprivatization of living conditions as opposed to isolation, the author concludes that "as time
passes, lack of privacy is increasingly designated as the most difficult aspect of adjustment to prison life." Id. at 237.
223. "If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of
course, will not undertake to review the decision." Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct.
3469, 3476 (1983). The Supreme Court of Washington took those words to heart;
it recently rejected the United States Supreme Court's new direction in fourth amendment jurisprudence and developed its own, more liberal approach to search and seizure
issues, using the Washington state constitution and laws. State v. Chrisman, 676
P.2d 419 (Wash. 1984). In doing so, the court said: "We are not, however, limited
to review under the Fourth Amendment. The federal constitution only provides
minimum protection of individual rights. Accordingly, it is well established that decisions from the federal courts 'do not limit the right of state courts to accord ...
greater rights.' " State v. Chrisman, 676 P.2d at 422.
224. ILL. CONST. art. I § 6.
225. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-5 (Smith-Hurd 1984), provides in part:
§ 5-5-5. Loss and Restoration of Rights. (a) Conviction and disposition shall
not entail the loss by the defendant of any civil rights, except under this
Section and Sections 29-6 and 29-10 of The Election Code, as now or
hereafter amended. (b) A person convicted of a felony shall be ineligible
to hold an office created by the Constitution of this State until the comple-
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have either categorically denied fourth amendment protection in certain
areas, or they have cut back on the scope of the fourth amendment
protection available.2 26 The most recent example is New Jersey v.
T.L. .227 Therein the Court held that although the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by public school officials, no warrant is required and the search can be initiated based on a requirement of reasonableness instead of probable cause.2 2 The Court reasoned that warrants would interfere with the need for swift and informal disciplinary measures in schools and probable cause would interfere with teachers' and administrators' need to maintain order in
the schools.2 29 This is another example of the Court's propensity to
relax or remove the fourth amendment requirements in the face of
legitimate governmental needs. 3 '
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's propensity to defer almost entirely to prison
authorities resulted in the loss of a significant amount of constitutional protection for prisoners. If prisons are to be more than sterile
warehouses where individual rights are nonexistent, then states should
reject the direction of the Supreme Court and provide prisoners with
civil rights protections afforded to all men and women in a civilized
society.
Had Palmer been successful in his suit, he probably would have
received a very minimal compensation, to go along with the satisfaction of knowing that a federal court, through the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, saw fit to protect
him from harassment by a guard. Without the opportunity for redress
tion of his sentence. (c) A person sentenced to imprisonment shall lose his
right to vote until released from imprisonment.
The Election Code sections provide for a loss of the right to work for the state
for five years following completion of sentence if convicted for certain elections violations. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 29-6, 29-10 (Smith-Hurd 1984).
226. For a list of other cases in which the Supreme Court has adopted a bright
line rule excluding certain "places from fourth amendment protection", see supra
note 77. See also LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries, 74 J. CRml.
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1171, 1174 (1983). Professor LaFave analyzes the recent Supreme Court decisions
on this issue, concluding that persons who engage in the activities which the Court
has deemed to be outside the scope of the fourth amendment must simply accept
the risk of surveillance.
227. 53 U.S.L.W. 4083 (1985).
228. Id. at 4087.
229. Id.
230. See supra note 85.
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in federal court, the inmate still might recover the monetary loss. But
the moral victory of knowing his fourth amendment rights must be
recognized by the possessor of his key to freedom-that victory cannot
be realized.
PHIL DABNEY

